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NON-MONOTONIC REASONING WITH 
LOGIC PROGRAMMING 
LUiS MbNIZ PEREIRA, JOAQUIM N. APARiCIO, AND JOSi J. ALFERES 
D Our purpose is to exhibit a modular systematic method of representing 
non-monotonic reasoning problems with the Well Founded Semantics 
WFS of extended logic programs augmented with explicit negation 
(WFSX), augmented by its Contradiction Removal Semantics (CRSX) 
when needed. We apply this semantics, and its contradiction removal 
semantics counterpart, to represent non-monotonic reasoning problems. 
We show how to cast in the language of logic programs extended with 
explicit negation such forms of non-monotonic reasoning as defeasible 
reasoning, abductive reasoning, and hypothetical reasoning and apply them 
to such different domains of knowledge representation as hierarchies and 
reasoning about actions. We then abstract a modular systematic method of 
representing non-monotonic problems in a logic programming semantics 
comprising two forms of negation avoiding some drawbacks of other 
proposals, with which we relate our work. a 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Recently, several authors have stressed and showed the importance of having an 
explicit second kind of negation within logic programs, for use in deductive 
databases, knowledge representation, and non-monotonic reasoning [3, 6, 11, 18, 
16, 32-34, 43, 391. 
In non-monotonic reasoning with logic programming there are two main ways of 
giving meaning to sets of rules when a given semantics is assigned to a program 
defined by the set of rules. We either accept as consequences the intersection of all 
models identified by some semantics, which is called skeptical reasoning [21, 21, or 
we consider one particular model identifying the consequences of a given set of 
assumptions-this form of reasoning is called braue reasoning in 1211. 
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It has been argued [31-341 that semantics with the well founded property are 
adequate to capture non-monotonic reasoning if we interpret the least model 
provided by the semantics (called the well founded model) as the skeptical view of 
the world and the other models (called extended stable models) as alternative 
enlarged consistent belief sets standing for different possibilities of brave reason- 
ing. A consequence of the well founded property is that intersection of all models 
identified by the semantics is itself a model belonging to the semantics. Thus proof 
procedures for capturing skeptical reasoning may be related to one model in the 
semantics-or, equivalently, to validity in all models-thus properly recasting the 
classic logical notion of entailment in logic programming. This is the case with 
Przymusinski’s extended stable model semantics 1371. 
Some proposals for extending logic programming semantics with a second kind 
of negation has been proposed. One such extension is the answer set semantics [61, 
which is shown to be an extension of stable model (SM) semantics [5] from the 
class of logic programs [20] to the class of logic programs with a second form of 
negation. In [18] another proposal for such extension is introduced, based on the 
SM semantics, where implicitly a preference for negative information (exceptions) 
over positive information is assumed. However, SM semantics is not well founded 
and even if the meaning of the program is defined as the intersection of all stable 
models, it is known that the computation of this intersection is computationally 
expensive. Another extension to include a second kind of negation is suggested by 
Przymusinski n [38]. Although the set of models identified by this extension enjoys 
the well founded property, it gives some less intuitive results [l] with respect to the 
coexistence of both forms of negation. Based on the XSM semantics, Przymusinski 
[39] also introduces the stationary semantics where the second form of negation is 
classical negation. Unfortunately, classical negation also implies that the logic 
programs under stationary semantics no longer admit a procedural reading. 
Well founded semantics with explicit negation (WFSX) [26] is an extension to 
well founded semantics (WFS) 1421 including a second form of negation called 
explicit negation, preserving the well founded property. Furthermore, explicit negu- 
tion is characterized by that, in any model, whatever the classical iteral 1, 1 A 11 
never holds, and by that whenever ~1 holds u I, the negation by default or 
implicit negation of I also holds, and I is false, thus avoiding the less intuitive 
results concerning the relation between the two forms of negation. However, 
1 v 7 1 is not mandatory, so the ability is kept for the truth value of some literals to 
remain undefined (cf. [l] for other approaches). 
When a second form of negation is introduced, contradiction may be present 
(i.e., I and T 1 hold for some 0 and no semantics is given by WFSX.’ In 1291 the 
authors define CRSX extending WFSX by introducing the notion of removing 
some contradictions and identifying the models obtained by revising closed world 
assumptions supporting those contradictions. One unique model, if any such 
revised model exists, is singled out as the contradiction-free semantics. When no 
contradiction is present CRSX semantics reduces to WFSX semantics. 
Furthermore, under WFSX, programs admit a procedural logic programming 
reading, which is not the case if truly classical negation plus material implication 
are used, as in [39], where case analysis is condoned. Under WFSX, rules in the 
I In [30] and [31] it is shown how WFSX relates to default theory. 
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program are undirectional (contrapositives are not implicit), maintaining the proce- 
dural flavour; the rule connective, +- , is not material implication, but is rather like 
an inference rule. 
Here we show to cast in the language of logic programs extended with explicit 
negation different forms of non-monotonic reasoning, such as defeasible reasoning, 
abductive reasoning, and hypothetical reasoning, and apply it to diverse domains of 
knowledge representation, such as hierarchies and reasoning about actions. 
Our main purpose is to abstract out and exhibit a modular and systematic 
method of representing non-monotonic reasoning problems with our CRSX seman- 
tics of logic programs. We argue that logic programming, extended with the 
concept of undefinedness and a suitable form of explicit negation, is very rich to 
represent such problems. 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review CRSX semantics 1291, 
which is an extension of the WFSX [26] programs which have no WFSX semantics. 
Then we identify simple forms of commonsense reasoning (e.g., defeasible reason- 
ing with exceptions, hypothetical reasoning) and show how they are represented by 
logic programs when CRSX is used. Using the notion of defeasibility and exception 
rules we then show how to formalize hierarchical reasoning where exceptions are 
also present. Next we represent problems where hypothetical reasoning is used to 
capture brave reasoning. 
Afterwards we use our approach to represent additional classical non-monotonic 
problems in reasoning about actions, arguing that it is sufficiently generic. Then, 
grounded on the former examples, we abstract a systematization of our problem 
representation methodology. Finally, we mention and compare with related work. 
2. CRSX REVIEW 
In this section we review a method for giving meaning to extended logic programs 
applicable whenever WFSX is taken as the semantics and the program is contradic- 
tory. We first review WFSX semantics [261 and next the method for revising 
contradictory programs [29]. 
2.1. Language Used 
Given a first-order language Lung, an extended logic program is a set of rules of 
the form H + B,, . . . , B,, - C,, . . . , - C, (m 2 0, n 2 O), where H, B,,.. ., 
B,,Cp..., C, are classical literals. A (syntactically) classical literal (or explicit 
literal) is either an atom A or its explicit negation 7 A. We use the symbol 7 to 
denote complementary literals in the sense of explicit negation. Thus 7 7 A = A. 
The symbol N stands for negation by default.’ N L is called a default literal. 
Literals are either classical or default literals. A set of rules stands for all its 
ground instances w.r.t. Lung. When n = m = 0 we may simply write H instead of 
H + . If S is a set of literals we say S is contrudictoly iff there is an atom L such 
2 This designation has been used in the literature instead of the more operational “negation as failure 
(to proue).” Another appropriate designation is “implicit negation,” in contradistinction to explicit 
negation. When 7 A is treated as a new predicate symbol in the way suggested in 1381, we call it 
pseudo-negation. A comparison among two different types of negation in logic programming can be 
found in [l]. 
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that {L , 1 LI G S. In this case we also say that S is contradictory w.r.t. L. If S is a 
set by _ S, we mean the set {N L/L E S}. 
2.2. WFSX Overview 
In this section we briefly review WFSX Well Founded Semantics for logic programs 
extended with explicit negation. For full details and the relation with default logic, 
the reader is referred to [26], [30], and [31]. WFSX follows from WFS plus one 
basic “coherence” requirement: 7 L entails N L (if L is explicitly false, L must be 
false) for any literal L. 
Example I. Take program P = {a + - b; b + - a; 7 a + }. If 7 a is simply envis- 
aged as a new atom symbol, say a’ (as suggested in [381), and well founded 
semantics [421 is used to define the semantics of P, the meaning of P is 
I 7 a, N 7 b), so that 7 a is true and a is undefined. We insist that N a should 
hold because 7 a does. Accordingly, the WFSX semantics of P is { -, a, b, 
- a, - 7 bl, since b follows from N a. 
Intuitively this can be construed as there exists an inference rule 
7L*-L (1) 
stating that whenever 7 L holds N L must also hold,3 that is, if 7 L is true, L is 
false. 
Definition 2.1 (Interpretation). By an interpretation Z of a language Lung we mean 
any set T U N F, where T and F are disjoint subsets of classical ground literals 
over the Herbrand base, and if 7 L E T, then L E F (coherence).4 The set T 
contains all ground classical literals true in I, the set F contains all ground 
classical iterals false in I. The truth value of the remaining classical iterals is 
undefined (the truth value of a default literal N L is the three-valued comple- 
ment5 of L). 
To account for coherence we next extend with an additional rule the P modulo 
Z transformation of [361, itself an extension of the Gelfond-Lifschitz modulo 
transformation: 
Definition 2.2 (P/Z Trunsfomution). Let P be an extended logic program and let Z 
be an interpretation. By P/Z we mean a program obtained from P by perform- 
ing the following four operations, of which the second only is novel: 
l Remove all rules containing a default premise N L such that L E I. 
l Remove all rules with a non-default premise L (resp. 7 L) such that 7 L E Z 
(resp. L E Z). 
3 Recall that since 7 7 L = L, expression (1) also means L = - 7 I,. 
4 For any literal L, if L is explicitly false L must be false. Note that the complementary condition 
“if f- E T, then 7 L E F” is implicit. 
The three-valued complement operation - over the set (f,u, t) of truth values is defined as 
-t=f, -f=t,and -u=u. 
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l Remove from all rules their default premises N L such that - L E I. 
l Replace all the remaining default premises by proposition u.~ 
The modification introduced is explained as follows: The second rule in the 
definition has the effect that if Z is to be a model containing 7 L, then it also must 
have -L, by definition of interpretation, and L is false. Since Z may not be 
contradictory it does not have L and any rule with L in the body may thus be 
discarded. On the other hand there is no need for a rule removing default literals 
-L such that 7 L E Z because either Z is coherent (see definition below) and 
contains - L and those literals will be taken into account by the third rule in the 
definition, or Z is not coherent and then it will not be a fixed point. 
The resulting program P/Z is by definition non-negative, and thus it always has 
a unique lea&P/Z) adapted from [36] (cf. its definition in the appendix to this 
paper). 
Note that least(P) is not always an interpretation in the sense of Definition 2.1. 
Conditions about noncontradiction and coherence may be violated. 
Example 2. Consider the non-negative program P = { 7 a + 7 b, 7 b +- , b +- u), 
where leust( PI = { 7 a, 7 b}. This set is not an interpretation. 
To avoid incoherence, when contradiction is not present, we define a partial 
operator that transforms any non-contradictory set of literals into an interpreta- 
tion. This operator is applied to any non-contradictory least(P/Z). 
Definition 2.3 (Cob Operator). Let Z = T U - F be a set of literals such that T is 
not contradictory. We define Co/z(Z) = Z U - { --, LIL E T}. Coh is not defined 
for other sets of literals. 
Definition 2.4 (@ Operator). Let P be a logic program, Z an interpretation, and 
J = least(P/Z). If Cob(J) exists we define @JZ) = Cob(J). Otherwise QP(Z> is 
not defined. 
Definition 2.5 (WFS with Explicit Negation). An interpretation Z of an extended 
logic program P is called an extended stable model (XSM of P iff @,(I) = I. 
The F-least extended stable model is called the well founded model. The 
semantics of P is determined by the set of all XSMs of P. 
Example 1 (continued). For the given program we have P/{a’, b, - a, - b’} = {b t 
; a’ + 1 and least(P/{a’, b, - a, N b’)) = {a’, b, - a, - b’). 
Example 3. Let P be 
a+-b,-c 
b+-a 
lC+- -d 
This program has a least model M, = { - d, 7 c, N c, - 1 a, N 7 b, - 7 d} and 
two extended stable models M2 = M, u { - a, b} and M3 = M, u {a, N b}. 
’ The special proposition u is undefined in all interpretations. 
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Considering model Mr we have, for P/M,, 
a+u 
b+u 
lC+ 
and least( P/M,) = J = { - d, c’, - a’, - b’, - d’, - c} = { - d, - --, d, -, c, - c, 
- 7 a, - 1 b). 
In the examples above the 
Coh(least(@p(Z))) = least(@JZ)). 
the following example. 
Example 4. Let P be 
a+-a (9 
b+--a (ii) 
-,b+ (iii) 
coherence principle was not needed, that is, 
However, this is not always the case, as shown by 
After the transformation, program P’ has a rule 6’ + , and there is no way of 
proving - b from rules (i) and (ii). Also, we have least(P’/{b’, - b, - a’}) = {b’, 
- a’} = M, which corresponds to the model 1 -J b, - 7 a) if the coherence principle 
is not applied. In our case we have C&(M) = (7 b, - b, - 7 al, which is the 
intended result. 
Dejinition 2.6 (Contradictory Program). Au extended logic program P is contradic- 
tory iff it has no semantics, that is, there exists no interpretation Z such that 
q(z) = I. 
2.3. Revising Contradictory fitended Logic Programs 
Here we review the semantics defined in [29]. For full details, properties (including 
those regarding the minimal@ criterion), and for comparisons with other seman- 
tics, the reader is referred to that report. 
Once we introduce explicit negation, programs are liable to be contradictory: 
Example 5. Consider program P = {a +- ; -, a + - 6). Since we have no clauses for 
b, by CWA it is natural to accept - b as true. By the second rule in P we have 
7 a, leading to an inconsistency with the fact a. Thus no set containing - b may 
be a model of P. 
We argue that the CWA may not be held of atom b since it leads to a 
contradiction (reductio ad absurdum). We show below how to revise’ this form of 
contradiction, by making a suitable revision of the incorrect CWA on b. This 
semantics identifies {a, - 7 a} as the intended meaning of P, where b is revised to 
undefined. Assuming b false leads to a contradiction; revising it to true instead of 
to undefined would not minimize the revised interpretation. 
’ We treat contradictory programs extending the approach of [271 and [28]. 
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In order to revise possible contradictions we need to identify those contradictory 
sets implied by applications of CWA. The main idea is to compute all conse- 
quences of the program, even those leading to contradictions, as well as those 
arising from contradictions. The following example provides an intuitive preview of 
what we intend to capture. 
Example 6. Consider program P: 
a+-b (9 d+a (iii) 
la+--c (ii) e+ la (iv) 
1. N b and N c hold since there are no rules for either b or c. 
2. 7 a and a hold from 1 and rules (i) and (ii). 
3. -a and N 7 a hold from 2 and inference rule (1) (cf. Section 2.2). 
4. d and e hold from 2 and rules (iii) and (iv). 
5. N d and = e hold from 3 and rules (iii) and (iv), as they are the only rules for 
d and e. 
6. N 7 d and N 7 e hold from 4 and inference rule (1) (cf. Section 2.2). 
The whole set of literals is then (-b, _ 7 b = c, w 7 7 a,a, =a, N ~a,d,e, 
N d, N e, N -I d, N 7 e). 
N.B. We extend the language with the special symbol I. For every pair of 
classical literals {L, 7 L) in the language of P, we implicitly assume a rule 
.l+L,7L8 
Definition 2.7 (Pseudo-interpretation). A pseudo-interpretation (p-interpretation for 
short) is a possibly contradictory set of ground literals from the language of a 
program. 
In the appendix, we extend the 0 operator [361 from the class of interpretations 
to the class of p-interpretations, in order to define the pseudo well founded model 
(p-model) as the set of all literals which are consequences of a (possibly contradic- 
tory> program. 
Now we have to identify sets of default literals true by CWA, whose revision to 
undefined can remove contradiction, by withdrawing the support of the CWAs on 
which the contradiction rests. 
We must identify how the truth of a literal depends on the truth of other 
literals, that is, how a literal L leans on a set of literals. These sets are called the 
dependency sets of L, DS( L). Intuitively,g a classical iteral A will be true if there is 
some rule in P with A as head such that all literals in its body are also true. A 
default literal -A will be true if either it has no rules, or all rules in P with head 
A have a false body, or the classical iteral 7 A is true. 
’ This is not strictly necessary but simplifies the exposition. Furthermore, without loss of generality, 
we only consider rules I + L, 7 L for which rules for both L and 7 L exist in P. We also use the 
notation I L to denote the head of rule I +- 15, 7 L. 
9 Se Definition A.7 in the appendix, for the formal definition. 
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Example 6 (continued). P = {a + - b; 7 a + N c; d + a; e + 7 a). In this case we 
have the following dependency sets: 
DS(-b)={-b} DS,(-a)={-a,b} 
DS(-c)={-c} DSz(-a)={-a,la, -c} 
DS(a) = {a, -b) 
DS(Ta)=(Ta,-c] 
DS,(-d)={-d}UDS,(-a)={-d,-a,b} 
DS,(-d)={-d}uDS,(-a)={-d,-a,la,-c) 
DS(J_~)={I~,~,T~,-b,-c} 
However, it is not enough to establish how a literal depends on its dependency 
sets. We are interested in those dependency sets of a literal L which belong to the 
p-model, which means that L also belongs to the p-model. These sets are called 
the supports of L: 
Definition 2.8 (Support of a Literal). A support SS,(L) w.r.t. a model M is a 
non-empty dependency set DS(L) such that DS(L) CM. If there exists an 
SS,(L), we say that L is supported in M. 
For simplicity, a support w.r.t. JP of P can be represented by SS(L). The 
notion of support can be extended to sets of literals: 
Definition 2.9 (Support of a Set of Literah). A support SS,({L,, . . . , L,,)) w.r.t. a 
model M is 
SS,,((L,,..., Lnl) = U "Mj(i)tLi) 
For each combination k of j(i) there exists one support of the set of literals. 
With the notion of support we are able to identify which literals support a 
contradiction, that is, the literal I . In order to remove a contradiction we must 
change the truth value of at least one literal from each support set of I. One 
issue is for which literals we allow initiating change of their truth values; another is 
how to specify a notion of minimal change. 
As mentioned before we only wish to initiate revision on default literals true by 
CWA, in a manner made precise later. To identify such revising literals we first 
define the following. 
Definition 2.10 (Default Supported). A default literal -A is default supported w.r.t. 
M if all supports SS,( - A) have only default literals. 
Example 7. Let P=(Ta;a + - b; b + c; c + d}. The only support of contradic- 
tion is { 7 a, a, - b, N c, N d}, and default supported literals are - b, - c, and - d. 
Here we are not interested in revising the contradiction by undefining - b or - c 
because they depend on - d. The reason is that we are attempting to remove only 
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those contradictions based on CWAs. Now, the CWA of a literal that is supported 
by another depends on the CWA of the latter. 
Definition 2,ll (Self-Supported Set). A set of default literals S is self-supported 
w.r.t. a model M iff there exists an SS,(S) = S. 
The set of revisable literals induced by P is the collection R, of all literals 
which belong to some self-supported set w.r.t. J$ (cf. definition A.8 in the 
appendix). 
It is worthwhile to note (cf. Proposition 4 in appendix) that if there are no rules 
for L nor for 7 L, then -L is a revisable literal. 
Example 7 (continued). In this example the self supported sets w.r.t. dp are 
{ - b, N c, - d), ( N c, -d}, and { - d}. Thus the only revising literal is - d. 
Note how the requirement of minimal@ ensures that only CWA literals not 
depending on other CWAs are revising. 
An atom can also be false by CWA if in a positive “loop.” Such cases are also 
accounted for: 
Example 8. Let P, = { 7 a; a +-b;b+b,c} and P,={Ta;a+--b;b+b;b+ 
c}. For P, the self-supported sets are {N b, N c}, { - b), and { - c). Thus N b and 
- c are revisable. For P2 the only minimal self-supported set is {N c), thus only 
- c is revisable. Note that the only support set of - b is (- b, - c). 
In Pz it is clear that - b depends on - c. So - b is not revisable. In P, the 
truth of - b can support on itself. Thus - b is also revisable. 
Given the revisable literals, we must find those on which the contradiction rests. 
This is done simply by finding the supports of I where the revisable literals occur 
only as leaves (these constitute the _L assumption sets) cf. definition A.10 in the 
appendix. In the examples shown later, assumption sets are always sets of default 
literals -A such that no rule for A exists in P (a very common simplifying case). 
Definition 2.12. A program P is revisable iff no assumption set for I , AS( I ), is 
empty. 
This definition entails a program P is not revisable if I has some support 
without default supported literals, as shown in the next example. 
Example 9. Consider P=(ya;a+--b;b+ -c;c) with A,={I,a, -a, la, 
- b, c). The only support of I is SS( _L > = (I , a, - a, 1 a, - b, c). Since there are 
in it no default supported literals, 9p = { ). Thus AS(I) = ( ) and the program is 
not revisable. 
Definition 2.13 (Removal Set). A removal set (RS) of a literal L of program P is a 
set of literals formed by the union of one non-empty subset from each AS,(L). 
Note that, although .the program may induce revising literals, this is not enough 
for a program to be revisable, as shown by the following example. 
Example 10. Consider the program P = { 7 a; a + - d; 7 d + - e). We have _B~ = 
l-e, - le, Td, -d,a,la, - la, - a), which is contradictory. The only revising 
literal is - e [ - d is not default supported since 7 d E SS( - d)] and thus AS( - d) 
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= { }. We have then AS(I) = { } and there is no possible revision, that is, the 
program is non-revisable. 
In order to make minimal changes that preserve indissociability of literals” we 
define the following. 
DeJinition 2.14 (Minimal Contradiction Removal Sets). Let R be a minimal removal 
set of I . A minimal contradiction removal set (MCRS) of program P is the 
smallest set MCRS such that R LMCRS, where MCRS is R plus its indissocia- 
ble literals. 
Definition 2.15 (Contradiction Removal Sets). A contradiction removal set (CRS) of 
a program P is either a MCRS or the union of MCRSs. 
Example 6 (continued). Consider P = {a + w b; -I a + N c; d c a; e t T a}. Since 
N b and = c are both revisable literals, we have AS(I) = {N b, = c}. The contra- 
diction removal sets are 
CRS,=RS,(1)={-b} 
CRS,=RS,(I)={-c} 
CRS,=RS,(I)=(-b, -c} 
2.3.1. Contradiction-Free Programs. In this section we show that for each contra- 
diction removal set there is a non-contradictory program obtained from the 
original one by a simple update; based on these programs, we define the CRSX 
semantics. 
Definition 2.16 (CWA Inhibition Rule). The CWA inhibition rule for an atom A is 
At-A. 
Any program P containing a CWA inhibition rule for atom A has no models 
containing -A.“. 
Definition 2.17 (Contradiction-Free Program). For each contradiction removal set 
CRS, of a program P we engender the contradiction-free program: 
P CRS, =def Pu{A +- -AI-A E CRS,} (2) 
Proposition 1. Every contradiction-free program is non-contradictory, that is, it has 
WFSX semantics. 
lo Another class of literals is identified by the CRSX theory, but they do not appear in any examples 
in this paper. Informally, indissociable liter& are those that depend only on each other (as in positive 
loops), so that their truth value must always be the same. In [29] it is shown that it is impossible to 
change the truth value of one without changing the truth value of another. See the appendix for the 
formal definition as well as examples. 
” This rule can be seen as the pro&&e integrity constraint + -A. In fact, since the WF 
semantics implicitly has in it the productive constraint +A, -A, the inhibition rule can be seen as the 
minimal way of expressing by means of a program rule that -A leads to an inconsistency, and forcing 
A not to be false. 
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Example 11. Consider the program P 
a+-b 1c+ -d 
b+-a,-c cc-e 
The well founded model is AP = { I c, N d, - 7 d, - e, - 7 e, 7 c, c, N -T c, N c, 
-b, - 7 b,a, - 7 a). The contradiction removal sets are 
CRS,={-d} CR&=(-e) CRS,={-d,-e} 
with CRS, and CRS, being minimal w.r.t. set inclusion. 
l Z&S, =Pu{d+- - d) and AP,,,, = { N e, N 7 e, c, N 7 c, N 6, - 7 b, a, 
-7a,-7 d) 
l PcRs, = P U {e + - e) and AP,,,, = (N d, -I c, - c, - 7 a, - 7 b, - 7 d, 
- 7e 1 
l PPCRs,=PU{e+-e,d+-d) and dP,,,,=(w Ta, w Tb, - Te, - Td) 
Definition 2.18 (CRSX Semantics). Given a revisable contradictory program P, let 
CRSi be any contradiction removal set for P. An interpretation Z is a CRSX 
model of P iff 
z=Q, PCRS,(Z) 
The least (w.r.t. z> CRSX model of P is called the CRWFM model.” 
(3) 
The contradiction removal semantics for logic programs extended with explicit 
negation is defined by the models satisfying equation (31, which represent the 
different forms of revising a contradictory program. 
Equation (3) says that the revised models of a revisable contradictory program 
are expressed as models of revised programs (using some contradiction removal 
set) when WFSX semantics is used. 
Example 8 (continued). For program P, the only assumption set is AS = IN b). 
Thus the only CRS is { N b), and the only CRSX model is { 7 a, - a, N c). 
For program P2 the only assumption set is AS, = { N cl. Thus the only CRS is 
IN c), and the only CRSX model is { 7 a, N a). 
3. SUMMARY OF OUR REPRESENTATION METHOD 
In this section we summarize and systematize the representation method adopted 
in all examples in the sequel. The type of rules for which we propose a representa- 
tion is, in our view, general enough to capture a wide domain of non-monotonic 
problems. Each type of rule is described in a subsection by means of a schema in 
natural language and its corresponding representation rule. 
l Definite rules. If A then B. The representation is B +-A. 
l Definite facts. A is true. The representation is: A. A is false. The representa- 
tionis TA. 
I2 In [29] it is proven that this model always exists. 
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l Defeasible (or maximally applicable) rules. Normally if A then B. The repre- 
sentation is 
B +A, Nab. 
where N ab is a new predicate symbol. As an example consider the rule 
“Normally birds fly.” Its representation is 
fly(X) +bird(X), -ah(X). 
Defeasible facts are a special case of defeasible rules where A is absent. 
9 Exceptions to defeasible rules. Under certain conditions COND there are txcep- 
tions to the defeasible rule H, + B,, N ab,: 
ab, +- COND. 
As an example, the representation of the exception “Penguins are exceptions 
to the ‘normally birds fly’ rule (i.e., rule f +- b, N abb)” is 
abb +- penguin. 
Preference rules are a special kind of exception to defeasible rules. 
l Preference rules. Under conditions COND, prefer to apply the defeasible rule 
H, + B,, N ab, instead of the defeasible rule Hz + B,, N ab,: 
ab, + COND, N ab,. 
As an example consider “For penguins, if the rule that says ‘normally 
penguins don’t fly’ is applicable then inhibit the ‘normally birds fly’ rule.” 
This is represented as 
ab-b +- penguin( X) , 5 ab_penguin( X) . 
l Unknown possible fact. F might be true or not (in other words, the possibility 
or otherwise of F should be considered): 
F+--7F. 
TF+-F. 
l Hypothetical (or possibly applicable) rules. Rule “If A then B” may or may not 
apply. Its representation is 
B +A,& 
hyp + N ~~YP 
1 hyp + -@P 
where hyp is a new predicate symbol. As an example consider the rule “Quakers 
might be pacifists.” Its representation is 
pacifist(X) + quaker(X), hypqp(X). 
hypqp(X) + N 1 hypqp(X). 
1 hypqp(X) * N hypqp(X). 
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4. EXPLICIT NEGATIVE INFORMATION 
In this section we show the advantage of introducing explicit negation for capturing 
knowledge representation in commonsense reasoning problems. 
Example 12. For instance, we represent rules such as birds Jty and rabbits are not 
birds and c is a rabbit and b is a bird as P: 
f(X) + b(X) 
7 b(X) + r(X) 
r(c) 
b(b) 
From r(c) follows 7 b(c), and hence -b(c), and so -f(c). From b(b) follows 
f(b) and - -T b(b): 
“C&= 
i 
b(b), - Tb(b), -r(b), - Tr(b), f(b), - if(b), 
1 b(c), -b(c), J-(C) 9 - lr(c), -f(c)7 1 N if(C) * 
Indeed, the factorization P/&j, is (trivially) 
f(b) + b(b) f(c) + b(c) 
7 b(b) + r(b) 7 b(c) + r(c) 
b(b) r(c) 
and we have 
least ( P/L$ ) 
i 
b(b), N Tb(b), -r(b), - Tr(b), f(b), N if(b), = 
1 b(c), -b(c), r(c), - lr(c), -f(c), - 1f(c) 
=A$. 
5. DEFEASIBLE REASONING 
In this section we show how to represent defeasible reasoning with logic programs 
extended with explicit negation. We want to express defeasible reasoning and give 
a meaning to sets of rules (some of them being defeasible) when contradiction 
arises from the application of the defeasible rules. In this case we suggest how to 
explicitly represent exceptions and preference rules. We do not intend to address 
the problem of automatic generation of exception rules or preference rules13 in 
order to restore consistency, but only to show how exceptions and preferences may 
be represented in the language. For instance, we want to represent defeasible rules 
such as birds normally ftr and penguins normal& don’t fir. Given a penguin, which is 
a bird, we adopt the skeptical point of view and none of the conflicting rules 
applies. Later on we show how to express preference for one rule over another in 
I3 See [18], where an implicit preference for negative information over positive information is 
introduced in the semantics of a logic program. 
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case they conflict and both are applicable. Consider for the moment a simpler 
version of this problem. 
Example 13. Consider the statements 
(i) Normally birds fly. (ii) Penguins don’t Jy, 
(iii) Penguins are birds. (iv) a is a penguin. 
represented by the program P (with obvious abbreviations, where ab stands for 
abnormal): 
f(X) + b(X), - ah(X) (i) 
7 f(X) ‘P(X) (ii) 
b(X) +p(X> (iii) 
p(a) (iv> 
Since there are no rules for ah(a), N ah(a) holds and f(a) follows. On the other 
hand we have p(a), and -T f(a) follows from rule (ii). Thus J$ is contradictory. In 
this case we argue that the first rule gives rise to a contradiction depending on a 
CWA on ah(a) and so must not conclude f(a). The intended meaning requires 
7 f(a) and -f(a). We say that in this case a revision occurs in the CWA of 
predicate instance ah(a), which must turn to be undefined. -f(a) follows from 
7 f(a) in the semantics. 
In this case CRSX identifies one contradiction removal set CRS = { - ah(a)}. 
The corresponding contradiction-free program is P U tab(a) + N ah(a)), and 
the corresponding CRWFM is {p(a), - 7 p(a), b(a), - 1 b(a), 1 f(a), -f(a), 
- 7 ah(a)}. 
In the example above the revision process is simple and the information to be 
revised is clearly the CWA about the abnormality predicate, and something can be 
said about a flying. However, this is not always the case, as shown in the following 
example. 
Example 14. Consider the following statements: (i) Normally birds jiy. (ii) Normally 
penguins don’t Jly. (iii) Penguins are birds. There is a penguin a, a bird b, and a rabbit 
c which does not ftr. The program P corresponding to this description is 
f(X) + b(X), -ah,(X) (i) p(a) 
7 f(X) +-p(X), N ah,(X) (ii) b(b) 
b(X) +p(X) (iii) r(c) 
7 f(c) 
REMARK 5.1. In program P above, the facts and rule (iii) play the role of 
non-defeasible information, and should hold whichever the world view one may 
choose for the interpretation of P together with those facts. 
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l About the bird b everything is well defined and we have 
-p(b)7 b(b), -r(b), - ub,( b), - ub,(b), f(b) 
- lP(b), - Tb(b), - -r(b), - lab,(b), N Tub,(b), - if(b) 
which says that bird b flies, f(b), and it cannot be shown that it is a penguin, 
-p(b). This is the intuitive result, since we may believe that b flies (because 
it is a bird) and it is not known to be a penguin, and so rules (i) and (ii) are 
non-contradictory w.r.t. bird b. 
l About the penguin a, use of rules (i) and (ii) provoke a contradiction in dP: 
by rule (i) we have f(u) and by rule (ii) we have 7 f(u). Thus nothing can be 
said for sure about a flying or not, and the only non-ambiguous conclusions 
we may infer are 
i 
p(u), b(u), -r(u), 
N lP(u)y - 7b(u), - Tr(u), - Tub,(u), - Tub,(u) I 
Note that we are being skeptical w.r.t. ub,(u) and ub,(u) whose negation by 
CWA would rise a contradiction. 
l About c rules (i) and (ii) are non-contradiction producing since -p(c) and 
N b(c) both hold, and we have 
i 
-p(c) 9 -b(c), r(c)? - 4(c), -a&(c), if(C) 
N lP(C), N 7 b(c), - Tr(c), - Tub,(c), - 7ub2(c), -f(c) 
The view of the world given by the least p-model dP of P using WFSX is14 
I P(U), b(a), -r(a), -ah(a), -&(a), f(a), 1 f(a),\ 
- ~P(a>> - ~b(a), - lr(a>, - ~ab,(ah - oh, - 1f(a>, -f(a), 
-p(b), b(b), - r(b), -4(b), -a&(b), f(b), 
- up, - lb(b), - or, - ~4(b), - ~ab,(bh 
> 
- if(b), 
-P(c), -b(c), r(c), -4(c), -h(c), -l f(c), 
\ - lP(C>, - lb(c), _ lr(c), - ~ab,(ch - I&, -f(c), 
A contradiction arises about penguin a (f(u) and 7 f(u) both hold) because of 
the (closed world) assumptions on ub,(u) and ub,(u), thus suggesting that the 
contradiction removal set is CRS = { - ub,(u), - ub,(u)}. 
Let us determine formally the CRS we presented above. The unique contradic- 
tion arising is due to penguin a, so it is enough to consider dependency sets 
concerning a. The pseudo-model XP of P contains {f(u), - 7 f(u), 7 f(u), 
-f(u), b(u), - 1 b(u), p(u), - 1 p(a), - ub,(u), 1 f(u), - ub,(u)). The depen- 
dency sets are 
q+z)) =Wf(u)) “DS(~f(u)) 
= {f(u),b(u), -ub,(u), lf(u),p(u), -ub,(u)) 
I4 Note that the difference between the J,, model presented and the set of literals considered as the 
intuitive result in the previous remark differ precisely in the truth valuation of predicate instances 
ah,(a), ab&), and f(a). 
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and 
DS(-ah,(a))={-ah,(a)} 
DS(-ah,(u)) = {“Ub,(U)} 
Since DS( I f(a)> GA%~ we have SS( I f(nj > = DS(I f(a& The assumption set is 
AS( 1 f@,) = { N ub,(a), N ub,(u)) because both N &,(a) and N ub,(u) are nega- 
tively supported. The contradiction removal sets are thus 
CRS, = { - ub,( u)} 
CR& = { - ub,(u)} 
CRS, = {-ub,(u), -ub,(u)) 
with CRS, corresponding to the most cautious meaning (i.e., no preferred assump- 
tions are made about abnormalities involving a). 
Let us check that A$,,, is a CRXSM model of P. Factorization PcRs,/!p 
yields 
3 CR+ 
f(b) + b(b) f(u) + b(a), n f(c) * b(c) 
7 f(b) +p(b) 7 f(u) +p(u),u lf(C> +p(c) 
b(b) +p(b) b(u) + p(u) b(c) *p(c) 
b(b) + p(u) +- r(c) + 
ub,(u) + u 
u,(u) + u 
and %,,,(4,,,) =4 cm’ 
5.1. Exceptions 
In general we may want to say that a given element is an exception to a normality 
rule. The notion of exception may be expressed in two different ways. 
5.1.1. Exceptions to Predicates 
Example 15. We express that the rule flies(X) t bird(X) applies whenever possi- 
ble but can be defeated by exceptions, using the rule 
flies(X) +-bird(X), -ub(X) 
If there is a bird b and a bird a which is known not to fly (and we do not know the 
reason why) we may express it by 7 flies(u). In this case 7 flies(u) establishes an 
exception to the conclusion predicate of the defeasible rule, and the meaning of the 
program” is 
bird(b), -ub(b), - Tub(b), - lbird(b), * lflies(b), jlies( b), 
bird(u), N ab(a>, - 7 bird(u), 7Jlies(u), -flies(u) 
I5 This is a simplified version of Example 13. 
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Note that nothing is said about &(a), that is, the CWA on &(a) is avoided 
({ N a(a)} is the CRS) since it would give rise to a contradiction on flies(u). This is 
the case where we know that bird a is an exception to the normally birdsfly rule, by 
observation of the fact that it does not fly: 7 flies(u). 
5.1.2. Exceptions to Rules. A different way to express that a given animal is some 
exception is to say that a given rule must not be applicable to the animal. To state 
that an element is an exception to a specific rule rather than to its conclusion 
predicate (more than one rule may have the same conclusion), we state that the 
element is abnormal w.r.t. the rule, that is, the rule is not applicable to the 
element: If element a is an exception to the flying birds rule, we express it as 
ub(u). 
In general we may want to express that a given X is abnormal under certain 
conditions. This is the case where we want to express penguins are abnormal w.r.t. 
the flying birds rule above, as follows: 
ub( X) +penguin( X) (4) 
REMARK 5.2. Rule (4) together with the non-defeasible rule (bird(X) + 
penguin(X), add that penguins are birds which are abnormal w.r.t. flying. 
Similarly of dead birds, that is, 
ub(X) +bird(X),deud(X) 
adding that dead birds are abnormal w.r.t. flying. 
REMARK 5.3. Alternatively, given 7 flies(X) + dead(X), the non-abnormality of 
dead bird a w.r.t. flying, that is, hub, may not be consistently assumed since it 
leads to a contradiction regarding flies(u) and 7 flies(u). 
5.1.3. Exceptions to Exceptions. In general we may extend the notion of excep- 
tioned rules to exception rules themselves, that is, exception rules may be defeasi- 
ble. This will allow us to express an exception to the exception rule for birds to fly, 
and hence the possibility that an exception penguin may fly or that a dead bird may 
fly. In this case we want to say that the exception rule is itself a defeasible rule: 
ub( X) + bird( X) , deud( X), - ub_deudbird( X) 
5.2. Preferences among Rules 
We may express now preference between two rules, stating that if one rule may be 
used, that constitutes an exception to the use of the other rule: 
Example 16. Consider again the flying birds example 
f(X) +-b(X), - ub,(X) (9 
1 j-(X) +p(X>, - ub,(X) (ii) 
b(x) +pW) (iii) 
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In some cases we want to apply the most specific information; above, there 
should be (since a penguin is a specific kind of bird) an explicit preference of the 
non-flying penguins rule over the flying birds rule: 
%X) *P(x), -%X) (5) 
If we have also penguin(a) and bird(b) the unique model contains 
1 
p(a), b(a), ah,(a) 7 -f(a), * Ub,(Q), 
-p(b), b(b), -4(b), f(b), - if(b), -b,(b) 1 
Rule (5) says that if a given penguin is not abnormal w.r.t. non-flying, then it must 
be considered abnormal w.r.t. flying. In this case we infer that b is a flying bird, and 
a is a penguin and also a bird, and there is no evidence (assume it is false) that it 
flies, w f(u). 
6. REPRESENTATION OF HIERARCHICAL TAXONOMIES 
In this section we illustrate how to represent taxonomies with logic programs with 
explicit negation. In this representation we wish to express general absolute (i.e., 
non-defeasible) rules, defeasible rules, exceptions to defeasible rules, as well as 
exceptions to exceptions, explicitly making preferences among defeasible rules. As 
we have seen, when defeasible rules contradict each other and no preference rule 
is present, none of them is considered applicable in the most skeptical reading. We 
want to be able to express preference for one defeasible rule over another 
whenever they conflict. In taxonomic hierarchies we wish to express that in the 
presence of contradictory defeasible rules we prefer the one with most specific”j 
information (e.g., for a penguin, which is a bird, we want to conclude that it does 
not fly). 
Example 17. The statements about the domain are as follows: 
(1) Mammals are animals. (6) Normally animals don’t fly. 
(2) Bats are mammals. (7) Normally bats fly. 
(3) Birds are animals. (8) Normally birds fly. 
(4) Penguins are birds. (9) Normally penguins don’t fly. 
(5) Dead animals are animals. (10) Normally dead animals don’t fly. 
and the following elements: 
(11) Pluto is a mammal. (12) Tweety is a bird. 
(13) Joe is a penguin. (14) Dracula is a bat. 
(15) Dracula is a dead animal. 
depicted as in Figure 1, and the preferences: 
(16) Dead bats do not fly though bats do. 
(17) Dead birds do not fly though birds do. 
(18) Dracula is an exception to the above preferences. 
” Nute in [ZS] suggests using this notion of more specific information to resolve conflicts between 
contradictory defeasible rules. 
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penguin it’ 
(13) 
;I joe 
:. . :. , . 
. : ci, . . . . . 
FIGURE 1. A more complex hierarchy. 
Our representation of the hierarchy is the following program: 
animal(X) +- mammal(X) 
mammul(X) + but(X) 
animal(X) + bird(X) 
bird(X) +penguin(X) 
animal(X) + dead-animal(X) 
7 flies(X) + animal(X), N ub,(X) 
flies(X) + but(X), ff ub,(X) 
j&?,s(X> + bird(X), Nub,(X) 
7 flies(X) +-penguin(X), N ub,(X) 
7 flies(X) +- deud_unimul(X), N ub,(X) 
mummul(pluto) 
birdheety) 
penguin(joe> 
but(druculu) 
dead_unimul(druculu) 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
6) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
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with the implicit hierarchical preference rules (not shown in Figure 1) 
ah,(X) + bat(X), N a&(X) 
ah,(X) + bird(X), -ah,(X) 
ah,(X) +penguin(X), - ub,(X) 
and the explicit problem statement preferences 
ah,(X) + deud._unimul(X), but(X), N ub,(X) (16) 
ah,(X) + dead_unimul(X), bird(X), N ah,(X) (17) 
ab,Wmd.z) (18) 
As expected, this program has exactly one model (coinciding with the minimal 
WFSX model), which is non-contradictory, no choice being possible and everything 
being defined in the hierarchy. The model is given by the table in Figure 2 where J 
means that the predicate (in the row entry) is true about the element (in the 
column entry), for example, penguin(joe) holds in the model. 
Thus Pluto does not fly, and is not an exception to any of the rules; tweety flies 
because it is a bird and an exception to the “animals don’t fly” rule; joe does not fly 
because it is a penguin and an exception to the “birds fly” rule. 
Note that although dracula is a dead animal, which by default do not fly [cf. rule 
(lo)] it is also considered an exception to this very same rule. Furthermore, rule 
(16) saying that “dead bats normally do not fly” is also exceptioned by dracula and 
thus the “bats fly” rule applies and dracula flies. Note that preference rules must 
be present in order to prevent contradiction from arising, thus preference rules 
play the role of removing contradictions arising in the initial specification of the 
problem. 
7. HYPOTHETICAL REASONING 
In this section we capture hypothetical reasoning in CRSX and interpret the 
results. In hierarchies everything is defined as seen, leaving no choices available (a 
unique model is identified as the meaning of the program). This is not the case in 
hypothetical reasoning situations. 
individ. 
predicat. 
deadanimal 
bat 
penguin 
mammal 
bird 
animal 
ab4 
abz 
ab3 
abt 
a& 
flies 
joe drscula pluto tweety 
z&J& 
FIGURE 2. The model of the 
more complex hierarchy example. 
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7.1. The Birds World’ 
In Example 13 we showed that the cautious or skeptical revision of defeasible rules 
gives a minimal model where no defeasible rule is used. There are however two 
other (non-minimal) models corresponding to alternative (non-cautious or hypo- 
thetical) meanings of the program (corresponding to alternative defeasible rules 
being applied or, equivalently, alternative revisions) when different assumptions 
are made. 
Example 18 
f(X) + b(X), - ah,(X) 
7 f(X) +p(X), N a&(X) 
b(X) *p(X) 
(9 
(ii) 
p(a) 
Here we may consider two alternative hypothetical worlds (note there is no 
preference rule present). In one of them (model M,) we consider the hypothesis 
that a is not an abnormal bird, - ah,(a), and so it flies, f(a). In this case we must 
also assume that - a&(a) does not hold. Another alternative (model M2) suggests 
that a is not an abnormal penguin, -ah,(a), and thus it does not fly, if(a). 
Perforce, - ah,(a) does not hold. A third model MJ accounts for the case where 
no assumption is made. 
The model structure (the contradictory pseudo-model L& included) is shown in 
Figure 3, where the shadowed model corresponds to the most skeptical view and 
where labels in directed edges show the revision being made from one model to the 
other. 
Note that since M,, M,, and the most skeptical model M3 are known to 
be non-contradictory, we may use the Q, operator of WFSX. Let US check 
that M, = { - 7 ah,(a), N 7 b(a), - 7 a&(a), - 7 f(a), - 1 p(a), N a&(a), 
b(a), f(a), p(a)1 is a model; that is, consider PCRS, with CRS, = (- a&(a)). 
-abt (a) -at$(a) 
-f(a) f(a) -f(a) -r(a) . . . 
-ab2(a) -abl (a) 
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h?S,/Ml is 
f(a) +- b(a) 
1 f(a) +p(a>, u 
b(a) +p(a) 
p(u) 
ub,(u) +- u 
6) 
(ii) 
Zeust(PcRs,/MI) = { - ub,(u), b(u), f(u), p(u)1 and 
N 1 b(u), f(u), N 1 f(u), p(a), 
%,,,(MI) = IN ubW b(u), 
- -, p(u)}. Similarly, we ha$e M2 = 1% ub,(u), b(u), 
T f(u), p(u)) and CRS, = &(uN, 
f(u) + b(u), u (3 
-l f(u) +pb) (ii) 
b(u) + p(u) 
p(u) 
ub,(u) + u 
Zeust(Pc,s2/M2) = { - ub,(u), b(u), 1 f(u), p(u)) and $_(Mz) = { N ub,(u), b(u), 
- -, b(u), 1 f(u), -f(u), P(U), - --, p(a)}. Note that in both cases we have M3 G Ml 
and M3 c M,, where M3 is the most skeptical view. 
REMARK 7.1. Note that every model with - ub,(u) is also a model with f(u), 
that 
is, P k N ub,(u) *f(u). The same holds for the other assumption, that is, P k 
- ub,(u) * T f(u). Another way of interpreting these rules is by saying that if we 
hypothesize that, say, rule (ii) has an exception in a, in the sense that ub,(u) + 
- ub,(u), namely, - ub,(u) cannot hold, then f(u) holds; that is, P U {ub,(u) + 
- ub,(uN I= ,J(u). 
Compare model M2 above with the unique model where an explicit preference 
was made (cf. Section 5.2). 
7.2. Hypothetical Facts and Rules 
In some cases we want to be make a rule hypothetically applicable, in the sense 
that we may consider the case where the rule is used to reason with, as well as the 
case where the rule is not considered in force. The same is desired of some facts, 
that is, we want to be able to explicitly represent that some unknown fact may be 
hypothesized true as well as false. If no hypothesis is made about the fact, the 
information it conveys is unknown or undecided, just like the conclusion ‘of a 
hypothetical rule which is not hypothesized. 
7.2.1. Hypothetical Facts. Similarly to rules about which we are undecided 
regarding their applicability, we might be unsure about some facts. Note that this is 
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different from not having any knowledge at all about such a fact. Consider this 
simple example: 
John and Nixon are quakers. John is a pacifist. 
represented by the program Pi: 
quuker( john) . pacifist( john) . quaker-( nixon). 
The AP, (which is the only XM model) is 
quaker-( nixon) quaker-( john) 
N puci$t( nixon) pacifist ( john) 
- 7 quuker( nixon) - 7 quuker( john) 
- 7 pucifist( nixon) - 7 puc@st( john) 
and expresses exactly what is intended; that is, John and Nixon are quakers, John is 
a pacifist and we do not have reason to believe Nixon is a pacifist, in this or any 
other model (there aren’t any others, in fact). Now suppose we want to add 
Nixon might be a pacifist (6) 
In our view we would not want in this case to be so strong as to affirm 
pucifst(nixon), thereby not allowing for the possibility of Nixon not being a pacifist. 
What we are prepared to say is that Nixon might be a pacifist if we do not have 
reason to believe he is not and, vice versa, that Nixon might be a non-pacifist if we 
do not have reason to believe he is not one. Statement (6) is expressed as 
pacifist ( nixon) + N -7 pucifist( n&on) (7) 
-7 pucifist( nixon) + - pucifst( nixon) (8) 
The first rule states that Nixon is a pacifist if there is no evidence against it. The 
second rule makes a symmetric statement. let P2 be the program P together with 
these rules. P, has a minimal model AP, (which is non-contradictory), 
I 
quaker-( nixon) quuker( john) 
pucifist( john) 
- 7 quuker( nixon) - 7 quaker-( john) 
- -T pucifist( john) 
and two more XMs, 
X&U, =dp, U { pacifst( nixon), - 7 pucifist( nixon)} 
XSM, =d$, U { 7 pacifist( nixon), - pucifist( nixon)} 
which is the result we were seeking. Statements of the form of (61 we call unknown 
possible facts, and they are expressed as by (7) and (8). They can be read as a fact 
and its negation, each of which can be assumed only if it is consistent o do so. 
7.2.2. Hypothetical Rules. Consider now the well known nixon-diamond example 
using now hypothetical rules instead of defeasible ones. 
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We represent these rules as named rules (in the fashion of [351), where the rule 
name may be present in one model as true, and in others as false. 
Normally quakers are pacifists. Normally republicans are hawks. 
Pacifists are non-hawks. Hawks are non-pacifists. 
Nixon is a quaker and a republican. Pacifists are non-hawks. 
There are other republicans. There are other quakers. 
The corresponding logic program is 
paciJist(X) + quaker(X), hypqp(X) 
hypqp(X) + - 1 hypqp(X) 
hawk(X) + republican(X), hyprh(X) 
hyprh(X) + - 7 hyprh(X) 
7 hawk(X) +pucijist(X) 
7 pucifist(X> + hawk(X)’ 
quuker(nixon) 
repubZicun(nixon) 
quuker(unother_quuker) 
republicun(unother_republicun) 
where the following rules are also added, making each normality instance rule 
about Nixon hypothetical rather than defeasible (cf. the representation of defeasi- 
ble rules in Section 5): 
hypqp( nixon) + - 7 hypqp(nixon) hyprh(nixon) + - 7 hyprh(nixon) . 
1 hypqp(nixon) + - hypqp(nrjcon) 7 hyprh(nixon) +- - hyprh(nixon) 
which is represented as in Figure 4. The whole set of models is represented in 
Figure 5, where the models (with obvious abbreviations) are 
M, = {quu(n>, rep(n), - 7 qua(n), N 7 rep(n), 
quu(u -qua), - 7 quu(u_quu), - rep(u_quu), - 7 rep(a__quu), 
hypqp(a -qua), - -, hypqp(u_quu), puc(a_qua), N 1 pada-qua), 
hyprh(u -qua), - 7 hyprh(u_quu), N 1 puc(u_quu), - huwk(u_quu), 
rep(u_rep), N 7 rep(a -rep), - quacu -rep>, - 7 qua(u_rep), 
hypdu-rep), - 7 hyprp(u_rep), rep(u_rep), - 1 rep(u_rep), 
hypqp(u_rep), - 7 hypqp(a_rep), -puc(u__rep), - 1 hawk(a_repN 
h4* = M, u (hyprh(n), - 7 hyprh(n), hawk(n), N 1 hawk(n), 1 pa&), 
-pa&)1 
M3 = M, u I -, hypqp(n), - hypqp(n), -pa&), N 1 hawk(n)} 
M4 = M, u { 7 hyprh(n), N hyprh(n), - hawk(n), - 1 pa&>) 
A& = M, u IhypqpCn), - 1 hypqp(n), pa&), - 1 p&z), 1 hawk(n), 
-hawk(n)} 
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pacifist d 
- 
hawk 
? ? 
quaker republican FIGURE 4. The nixon diamond. 
ano!he\ dlher 
quaker nixon republican 
iI46 = A42 u I-l hypqp(n), - hypqp(n), -pa&), - 7 hawk(n)) 
I& = iv4 u {hypqp(n), - 7 hypqp(n), pm(n), - 1 pudn), N 1 hawk(n)) 
MS = M3 u { 7 hyprhbz), - hyprhbd, N hawk(n), N 7 pa&)) 
M, being the most skeptical one. Edge labels represent the hypothesis being 
made when going from one model to another. 
Note that possible rules are different from defeasible rules. Defeasible rules are 
applied “whenever possible” unless they lead to a contradiction. Possible rules 
provide equally plausible alternative extensions. In the most cautious model no 
hypotheses are made about the applicability of normality rules. A model exists 
considering the applicability of the republicans are hawks normality rule as well as 
another model (M,) considering the non-use of it. Note that M, and M3 differ 
precisely in the way the rule is interpreted. In some sense M3 is a model where the 
normality rule is not considered at all, while in M, although the rule is considered, 
it is not applied since there are other equally applicable rules which together with 
it would give rise to an inconsistency. 
h&W 
\ 
1 Ww(n) - fwW4 \ I 
FI( GURE 5. Models of the nixon-diamond problem using hypothetical rules. 
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REMARK 7.2. Note that with this form of representation we might as well add 
abqp or 7 abqp, and thus the treatment of explicit negative information becomes 
similar to that of positive information. In this case we may now hypothesize about 
the applicability and non-applicability of each normality rule. However, the most 
skeptical model (where no hypotheses are made) is still identical to the one where 
normality rules were interpreted as defeasible rules, the difference being that in 
this case revision is enforced since the + model is non-contradictory. 
In this form of representation of the nixon-diamond problem there is no need 
for revision since all models are non-contradictory. 
8. APPLICATION TO REASONING ABOUT ACTIONS 
We now apply the programming methodology described above to some reasoning 
about action problems and show that it gives correct results. The situation calculus 
notation [23] is used, where predicate holds@, S) expresses that property or fluent 
P holds in situation S; predicate normal(P, E, S> expresses that in situation S, 
event or action E does not normally affect the truth value of fluent P; the term 
result(E, S) names the situation resulting from the occurrence of event E in 
situation S. 
8.1. The Yale Shooting Problem 
This problem, supplied in [lo], will be represented in a form nearer to the one 
suggested in [18]. 
Example 19. The problem and its formulation are as follows: 
0 Initially (in situation SO) a person is alive: holds(ulive, SO). 
l After loading a gun the gun is loaded: holds(louded, result(loud, S)). 
l If the gun is loaded, then after shooting it the person will not be alive: 
7 holds( alive, result( shoot, S)) + holds( loaded, S) . 
l After an event things normally remain as they were (frame axioms), that is: 
-properties which hold before will normally still hold after the event, 
holds(P,result(E,S)) +-holds(P,S), -ub(P,E,S)(pp)” 
-properties which do not hold before the event will normally not hold 
afterwards as well, 
Tholds(P,result(E,S)) + Tholds(P,S), -ab(TP,E,S)(np)‘* 
“pp stands for positive persistence. 
l8 np stands for negative persistence. 
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Consider the question “What holds and what doesn’t hold after the loading of a 
gun, a period of waiting, and a shooting?” represented as two queries: 
+ holds@, result(shoot, result(waif, resulf(load, so)))) 
+ -, holds(P, resultMoot, result(wait, resultCloud, SO)))) 
With this formulation the & model is the only XSM model. The subset of its 
elements that match with at least one of the queries is” 
{ holds( loaded, ~3)) N 1 holds( loaded, s3), 7 holds( alive, ~3)) - holds( alive, ~3)) 
which means that in situation s3 the gun is loaded and the person is not alive. This 
result coincides with the one obtained in [16] for holds. 
8.2. Multiple Extensions 
Example 20. To get the result given by circumscription [22] and default logic [40], 
we must reformulate the problem by adding the following sentence: 
l The wait event might not preserve the persistence of the loaded property; in 
other words, after a wait event the gun might (or might not) be loaded. 
This clearly means an unknown but hypothetical application of (pp>. So the 
rules to add are 
ub(louded, wait, S) + - 7 ub(louded, wait, S) 
7 ub(louded, wait, S) + N ub(louded, wait, S> 
Now the .,Hp model contains N 7 holds(louded, ~3). This means that in &p we 
have no proof that the gun is not loaded. This is acceptable because there is no 
evidence for it to be unloaded. All other properties are unknown in &. The rules 
above state that it is equally possible for loud to be abnormal with respect to the 
wait event, as well as to be non-abnormal. We have two XMs, corresponding to the 
two extensions. One extension contains 
{ holds( alive, s3), - 7 holds( alive, ~3)) N 7 holds( loaded, s3)} 
and the other contains 
{ 7 holds( alive, ~3)) - holds( alive, ~3)) holds( loaded, ~3)) - 7 holds( loaded, s3)} 
8.3. Other Reasoning About Action Problems 
In this section we represent problems D2 and D6 of [191, which are classified 
as “Reasoning about Action-Temporal Projection” and “Reasoning about Action 
-Temporal Explanations with Actions of Unknown Kinds,” respectively. 
I9 Where s3 denotes the term result(shoot, resulf(wait, result(load, SO))). 
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Example 21. the assumption of problem D2 and its representation are as follows. 
l After an action is performed things normally remain as they were: 
holds(P, result@, S)) + ho&V, S), - ab(P, E, SXpp) 
-7 holds(P, result(E, S)) + -, holds(P, S>, - ab( 1 P, E, Sxnp> 
l When the robot grasps a block, the block will normally be in the hand: 
ho&( hand( B) ,result(gmsp(B),S)) + -ub(hund(B),grusp(B),S) 
l When the robot moves a block onto the table, the block will normally be on 
the table: 
holds( tuble( B) ,resuZt(move(B),S)) 
+holds(hund(B),S), -ub(tuble(B),move(B),S) 
l Initially block A is not in the hand and not on the table: 
7 hofds( tuble( a), SO) 7 holds( hund( a), SO) 
The conclusion “After the robot grasps block a, waits, and then moves it onto 
the table, the block will be on the table” can be represented by 
~holds(tuble(u),result(move(u),resuZt(wuit,result(grasp(u),sO)))) 
and belongs to the .#j, model of the program. 
Example 22. The assumptions of problem D6 are those of D2 plus “After the robot 
performed two actions, a was on the table.” The conclusion is “The first action was 
grasping a, and the second was moving it onto the table.” We reach this conclusion 
by verifying that 
+ holds(tuble(u),result(move(u),resuZt(grasp(u),sO))) 
is the only goal of the form 
+ holds( tuble( u), result( Action2, result( Actionl, SO))) 
which is in JP. 
9. ABDUCTION WITHIN CRSX 
We will begin by giving a definition of abduction within CRSX semantics very 
similar to the ones given for classical logic in [4] and [141. Finally, we present a 
theorem that relates the CRXSMs models of a modified program with abduction 
within the WFSX semantics of the original program. 
Definition 9. I Olbductive Theory). An abductive theory is pair (P, Ab), where P is 
a program and Ab is a set of literals in ZP. 
Ab is the set of all literals we are prepared to assume true if that contributes to 
prove some goal. We call these literals the abductible literals. 
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Definition 9.2 Mbductive Solution). For a given abductive theory (P, Ab), a subset 
S of Ab whose elements are not in the CRWFM model of P is an abductive 
solution for literal L iff the CRWFM model of P U S exists and contains L. 
Example 23. Consider the abductive theory ({f+- b, N abb; 7 f cp, N abp; b +- 
p; abb +p, - abp), (b, PI>. 
The CRWFM model of P U {p} contains 
{P, - Tp,b, 7 f, -f, -abp,abb, - 7 b) 
and p is an abductive solution for 7 f. 
Now that we have defined abduction within CRSX semantics, we define a 
modification of a given program based on the abducible literals; we then establish 
results between the CRXSMs of the modified program (abducing program) and the 
abductive solutions in the original one. 
Definition 9.3 tibducing Program). An abducing program for an abductive theory 
(P, Ab) is a program obtained by adding to P, for all literals L in Ab, two rules 
oftheform L+---bland -IL+-L. 
Example 23 (continued). 
f+b, -abb Tf +p, -abp 
bcP abb +p, - abp 
b+- Tp -JPC”P 
is the abducing program for the theory 
({f+b, -abb;Tf+p, -abp;b+-p;abb+-p,-abp},{p}) 
Notice how the abducing program is based on adding rules to make each 
abducible a hypothetical fact (cf. Section 7.2.1), which can be used for explanation 
if necessary, but otherwise has no predictive value since it remains undecided in 
the least model. 
Theorem 9.1 Mbductive Solution). S is an abducitive solution for L in an abductive 
theory (P, Ab) iff all CRXSM models which contain S of the abducingprogram 
for the abductive theory ( P, S > also contain L and at least one exists. 
This provides a technique for performing abductive inference, namely, by 
considering the CRXSM models where some desired conclusion holds. 
Example 23 (continued). The adbucing program above has the following CRXSMs: 
CRXSM, = { } 
CRXSM,=(P, * Ip,b, N -b,lf, -f, -abp, - Tabp,abb, - -,abb) 
CmSM, = { 7 P, “p, -b, - abb, - abp, - 7 abb, - 7 abp, -f, N 7 f} 
and the model containing p also contains -, f. 
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10. RELATED WORK 
In this section we compare our approach with other logic programming proposals. 
Since the underlying semantics is different from that of other approaches” we 
focus the discussion from the point of view of dealing with inconsistency and 
representing defeasible reasoning. 1131 is a survey of abductive reasoning in logic 
programming. 
When making assumptions (introduced by some non-monotonic reasoning for- 
malism), inconsistency may arise. Some approaches have been proposed recently to 
deal with inconsistency. One common goal to those approaches is the identification 
of maximum consistent assumption sets. Several techniques have been suggested to 
solve this goal. 
The technique we follow goes along the lines presented in [44],2l which roughly 
starts by considering every consequence of a program, even those raising contradic- 
tions. In our approach we consider then dependency information, for the special 
atom I to define the set of revisable literals, and identify sets of negative 
assumptions (assumption sets) which may not be held together (contradiction 
removal sets). In [44] the disjunctive normal form of a formula is defined and, 
together with dependency information, a model is identified as the meaning of the 
program. 
Dung 131 studies also the problem of restoring consistency of extended logic 
programs (with two forms of negation), in the well founded semantics. He applies a 
preferred extension semantics to an abductive framework obtained from the 
original extended logic program. The extended logic program is first transformed to 
a logic program renaming every explicit negative literal 7 L into a new positive 
literal L’. The program so obtained is transformed to a suitable abductive frame- 
work renaming NAF literals -L by L* and adding an integrity constraint 
-I(L AL*) along the lines of [4], plus a second integrity constraint of the form 
T(L A L’) expressing that a literal and its explicit negation may not both hold 
together. Extended preferred extensions (in the sense of [4]) identify sets of 
assumptions which may be consistently added (i.e., satisfying the integrity con- 
straints). 
An alternative approach to restoring consistency starts from the set of conse- 
quences of the (inconsistent) theory and retracts literals until consistency is 
restored. This is the approach followed in [9], 1171, and [29]. 
Exploring the relation between truth-maintenance systems and logic program- 
ming, Giordano and Martelli [8] suggest identifying the (stable model) semantics of 
a logic program with integrity constraints as the semantics of a transformed logic 
program, without integrity constraints, using all the contrapositive variants of the 
original program rules. The idea of using the contrapositives is also explored by 
Jonker [12] but considering the well founded semantics. 
Satoh and Iwayama [41] use TMS techniques to maintain consistency while 
computing stable models of general logic programs with integrity constraints, and 
apply it to compute abduction in an abductive framework (cf. [4, 1511. 
In [18] Kowalski and Sadri suggest an extension (e-answer sets) based on stable 
model semantics, dealing with two forms of negation. In the semantics suggested 
” For a comaprison regarding the underlying semantics and other semantics, refer to [ll. 
” Athough the approach suggested here and presented as a natural deduction system contains two 
forms of negation, the semantics are, however, different. 
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therein, there is an a priori explicit commitment to given preference of negative 
information (exceptions) over positive information. In our present approach we 
showed that there is no need to make such a commitment at the semantic level 
(actually we argue that it is too strong) and that preferences can be represented 
instead explicitly at the language level. This stance was already adopted by the 
present authors previously in a different semantics [34] and independently by Inoue 
[ll]. Moreover, the ability to state preferences at the language level provides a 
more general mechanism for dealing with preferences. Dealing with preferences at 
the language level provides a greater modularity (in the sense that it is enough to 
consider local changes in the new program) when introducing new preference rules 
into an existing logic program. 
Because of its inherent asymmetry, the “rules with exceptions” approach [181 
requires changing previous rules in the program each time an exception to an 
exception is made, because head literals need to change. For instance, a three-level 
hierarchy of birds, penguins, and flying penguins requires rules like 
jIy(X) + bird(X) 
noj&(X> + penguin(X) 
j@(X) +flying-penguin(X) 
and the exceptions 
1 fEyGO + nofiy(X) 
7 nofly (X > + flying _penguin( X ) 
We allow both positive and negative conclusions in rules, inclusively for the 
same predicate. 
The extension of well founded semantics to explicit negation provides a (non- 
contradictory) well founded model of definite conclusions in cases where e-answer 
set semantics provides only alternative models. For instance, in the pacifist/hawk 
example we obtain a well founded model containing the facts {quaker, republican}, 
besides the two alternative e-answer sets. 
We thank ESPRIT BR projects COMPULOG (no. 30121, COMPULOG 2 (no. 68101, and Junta 
National de InvestigaqLo Cientifica e Tecnolbgica for their support. 
A. CRSX REVIEW 
Definition A.1 (The 0” Operator). Let P be a logic program and J a p-interpreta- 
tion. The operator 0;:9+4 on the set .Y of all three-valuedp-interpretations 
of P is defined as follows. If Z EY is a p-interpretation of P and A is a ground 
classical iteral, then O;(Z) is the p-interpretation defined by the following: 
1. 69;(Z)(+) = 1 iff there is a rule A CL,,. . ., L, in P such that for all i 5 n 
either JCL,) = 1, or Li is positive and Z(Li) = 1; 
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2. O;(ZXA) = 0 iff one of the following holds: 
(a) for every rule A c-&,..., L, in P there is an i I IZ, such that either 
J(L,) = 0, or Li is positive and Z(Li) = 0; 
(b) $7 A) = 1; 
3. O,X(ZXA) = l/2, otherwise. 
Note that the only difference between this definition and the definition of 0 
operator introduced in [36] is condition 2(b) capturing the coherence requirement, 
or inference rule (1). Furthermore, since it is defined over the class of p-interpreta- 
tions, it allows that for a given literal L, we may have O;(Z)(L) = 1 as well as 
Of(Z)(L) = 0. 
Proposition 2. For every p-interpretation J, the operator 0,X is monotone and has a 
unkgue least jixed point given by 0; T w, also denoted by a’(J).** 
Dejinition A.2 (P-Model). Given a program, a p-model is a p-interpretation Z such 
that 
Z=W(Z) (9) 
REMARK A.l. Note that if a p-model M is contradictory w.r.t. L, then M is 
inconsistent w.r.t. L by virtue of inference rule Cl), although the converse is not 
true. 
Definition A.3 (Well Founded Model). The pseudo well founded model kj, of P is 
the F-least p-model. 
The non-minimal models satisfying (9) above are (pseudo) extended models 
(XMs for short). To compute the p-model JP, we define the following transfinite 
sequence {Z,} of fixed points: 
Z, = (07 0) 
Z a+1 = W(Z,) = 0;‘” 
z*= u a < sZ, for limit ordinal 6 
Equivalently, the pseudo well founded model _HP of P is the F-least fixed point 
of (9) and is given by -HP = Z* = fl’ T *. 
Definition A.4 A program P is contradictory iff _L CY._&~. 
Example 6 (continued). P = {a + - b; 7 a t - c; d t a; e t 7 a}, 
@~2=01(O~1)={a, - la,la, -a,d, - ld,e, - le, -b, - lb, -c, 2 
- lC, - d, - -T d, N e, N 7e}=Od”=Z 3 
” Recall [36] that the F-least interpretation used to compute the least tied point of 0; T w is -Z$ 
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@~2=@I,(@~1>=(~, - TU,TU, -a,d, - Td,e, - 7e, -b, - Tb, NC, 
- lC, -d, - 7 d, we, - Te)=@,T”=14=13 
Note that the set of consequences of P is inconsistent in a, d, and e, although it 
is contradictory only in a. 
Proposition 3. If the pseudo well founded model _Hr is non-contradictory, then it is 
consistent. 
This suggest hat in order to get revised non-contradictory consistent models we 
must know where contradiction arises from and prevent it. 
The least three-valued model of a non-negative program can be defined as the 
least hxpoint of the following generalization of the van Emden-Kowalski least 
model operator v’ for definite logic programs: 
Definition A.5 (?P* Operator). Suppose that P is a non-negative program, I is an 
interpretation of P, and A is a ground atom. Then ‘P*(Z) is an interpretation 
defined as follows: 
l ?*(Z)(A) = 1 if there is a rule A +-A,, . . . , A, in P such that I(A,) = 1 for 
all i In. 
l W*(Z)(A) = 0 iff for every rule A + A,, . . . , A,, there is an i I n such that 
Z(AJ = 0. 
l ‘4’*(ZXA) = l/2, otherwise. 
Definition A.6 (Least-Operator). We define least(P), where P is a non-negative 
program, as the set of literals T U - F obtained as follows: 
l Let P’ be the non-negative program obtained by replacing in P every 
negative classical iteral 7 L by a new atomic symbol, say L’. 
l Let T’ U - F’ be the least three-valued model of P’ (as defined in [36], say). 
l T U N F is obtained from T’ U N F’ by reversing the replacements above. 
Definition A. 7 (Dependency Set). A dependency set of a literal L in a program P, 
represented as DS(L), is obtained as follows. 
1. If L is a classical iteral: 
(a) If there are no rules for L, then the only DS(L) = {L}. 
(b) For each rule L + B,, . . . , B,(n 2 0) in P for L, there exists one DS,(L) 
= (L) u U ,DSj,,,(13,> for each different combination k of one j(i) for 
each i. 
2. For a default literal -L: 
(a) If there are no rules in P for L, then a DS( - L) = { N L}. 
(b) If there are rules for L, then choose from every rule for L a single literal. 
For each such choice there exist several DS( - L); each contains - L and 
one dependency set of each default complementU of the chosen literals. 
(4 If there are rules for 7 L, then there are, additionally, dependency sets 
DS(- L) = I-L} U DS,(7 L) for each k. 
z The default complement of a classical iteral L is - L; that of a default literal - L is L. 
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Definition A.8 (Revising and Co-Revising Literals). Given a program P with pseudo 
well founded model _&, we define CO@~, the co-revising literals induced by P, as 
the set of literals belonging to some minimal self-supported set w.r.t. Jp. We 
define sp, the revising literals, as the set of co-revising literals L such that 
-iLWr. 
Proposition 4. 
1. If there are no rules for L nor for 7 L, then - L is a revising literal. 
2. If there are no rules for L but there are for 7 L, then - L is a co-revising literal 
but not a revising one. 
3. If there are no rules for L, then - L is a co-revising literal. 
Definition A.9 (Indissociable Set of Literals). A set of default literals S is indissocia- 
ble iff it is a minimal self-supported set, and S is its only support. 
Example24. Let P={p;p+--a;a+b;b+c;c+a}. {-a, -b,-c) is a set of 
indissociable literals. 
Definition A.10 (Assumption Set). Let P be a program with meaning Jp and 
L Mr. An assumption set AS(L) is defined as follows, where 3’p is the set of 
the revisable literals induced by program P. 
1. If L is a classical iteral: 
(a> If there is a fact for L, then only AS(L) = { 1. 
(b> For each rule L + B,, . . . , B,(n>l)in PforLsuchthat{B,,...,B,)c 
dp, there exists one AS,(L) = U ,ASj~i,(Bi) for each different combina- 
tion k of one j(i) for each i. 
2. For a default literal _ L: 
(a) If N L l .%?r, then the only AS( - L) = I - L}. 
(b) If L E co -sr, then there is an AS( - L) = I-L}. 
cc> If there are rules for L, then choose from every rule for L a single literal 
whose default complement belongs to Jp. For each such choice there 
exists several AS( - L); each contains one assumption set of each default 
complement of the chosen literals. 
(d) If there are rules for 7 L and 7 L M,, then there are, additionally, 
assumption sets AN-L) = AS,( 7 L) for each k. 
Example 25. Let P be 
a+-b b+c 
The only self-supported set is S = { N b, N c). Moreover, the only support of S is 
itself. Thus N b and N c are revisable and indissociable. 
As the only assumption set of I is { N b, - c}, there are three removal sets: 
R,={-bJ, R,={-cl, and R,={-b, - c}. Without indissociability, one might 
think that for this program there exist three distinct ways of removing the 
contradiction. This is not the case since the XSMs of Pk,, Pk,, and Pk, are exactly 
the same, that is, they all represent he same revision of P. This is accounted for by 
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minimal contradiction removal sets. In fact there exists only one MCRS( - b, w c} 
and thus the only contradiction-free program is PR,. 
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